Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015): Landmark Judgment on Section 66A & Free Speech

This Case Analysis is written by Hitesh Bhootra, he is a 3rd-year LL.B. student at Aishwarya College of Education and Law. He also serves as an author at Lexful Legal.

Learn about the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (AIR 2015 SC 1523) that struck down Section 66A of the IT Act. Explore key facts, issues, judgment, significance, and impact on online free speech in India.

Court: Supreme Court of India 

Bench: R.F. Nariman, J. Chelameswar

Citation: AIR 2015 SUPREME COURT 1523 

Date of Judgment: 24 March 2015

Background of the case:

The case arose after the arrest of two girls in Maharashtra.

One girl posted a Facebook post questioning the shutdown of Mumbai after the death of Bal Thackeray.

They protested against the unreasonable holiday in Mumbai.

They were arrested by police under section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which criminalizes any person who sends, by means of a computer source, any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character or annoyance.

The provision carried imprisonment up to 3 years.

Several arrests were made under section 66A, which sparked public outrage, claiming:     Violation of free speech. Shreya Singhal, a law student, filed a PIL in the Supreme Court to challenge the constitutionality of Section 66A.

Key constitutional issues before the court:

Issue 1

Whether section 66A violates Article 19(1)(a) freedom of speech & expression, and it fails the test of reasonable restriction under Article 19(2).

Issue 2

Whether section 66A is vague, overbroad, arbitrary, and susceptible to misuse.

Issue 3

 Whether Section 69A & the Information Technology (Blocking) Rules, 2009, violate Article 19(1)(a).

Issue 4

Whether Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, imposes unconstitutional obligations on intermediaries.

Argument by Petitioner:

Section 66A criminalized pure speech, such as opinions, criticism, etc., merely because they cause annoyance or inconvenience.  Such speech is fully protected under Article 19(1)(a) unless it fails the test of reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2), which are mentioned:

• Security of the state
• Public order,
• Decency,
• Morality,
• Contempt of court,
• Defamation and Incitement.

The expression used in 66A does not match any grounds in Article 19(2), so it is not recognized as grounds for restriction.

Words like “annoying,” “grossly offensive,” “menacing,” and “inconvenient” are open-ended & undefined.

Citizens cannot predict what conduct is criminal. Vagueness leads to arbitrary & discriminatory arrests. Violation of Article 14. Arbitrary classification.

Offline speech in newspapers or on TV was not criminalized, but online users were treated differently.

Petitioner argued that blocking content is a direct restriction on speech. Any restriction on speech must be in the form of: reasonable, narrow, tailored, and transparent.

Petitioner also argued that the blocking orders are secret. This is neither to the public nor to the author. This violates the right to be heard under Article 14.

Petitioner argued that intermediary guidelines forced intermediaries to remove content upon just a private notice alleging the illegality, without a court order.

This turned the platform or intermediaries into private censors; they would over-comply and remove legal content, also.

Petitioner contends that takedown obligations are only on court or government orders.

Argument by Respondent:

The government argued that words like “offensive,” “menacing,” and “hatred” can relate to Act 19(2)

• Public order
• Incitement
• Defamation

Therefore, it can be seen that section 66A fits within Act 19(2).

The government requested the court to interpret 66A narrowly.

Arrest should be required to be done by senior-level police, as approved.

The court should avoid striking down the section and instead impose the guidelines.

The government argued that offensive messages, false rumours, and posts can cause violence and panic. Therefore, restrictions are justified under Article 19(2).

Some misuse by police or arrest of people does not make the provision unconstitutional. The solution is proper implementation.

The government argued that, instead of prosecuting people, blocking harmful content is a preventive measure, and the blocking rules contain sufficient procedures: 

• The standing committee reviews every blocking request.
• A detailed reason in writing is mandatory.
• The review committee checks the legality of the blocking order.
• ⁠Emergency blocking is reviewed in 48 hours.

Rules provide adequate checks and are balanced.

Confidentiality ensures the timely blocking and effective measures.

The government argued that intermediaries are given “safe harbor.” They are not liable if they host content of a third party.

The intermediary removes the content on private notice because victims may not have the resources to go to court first.

Without such a notice & removal of content, harmful content would remain online for a long time.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 entirely; the court declared that Sec 66A is void & unconstitutional because it violates Article 19(1)(a), freedom of speech. And the court concluded that it did not meet the standard of reasonable restriction under Article 19(2).

The court highlighted that the vague & overbroad language “fear of prosecution” suppresses legitimate speech. Thus, Sec 66A is unconstitutional in its entirety. Section 69A & Blocking Rules, 2009, are upheld. The court upheld the validity of Section 69A because it contains adequate procedural safeguards in place to prevent misuse and protect freedom of speech. There is sufficient procedure. Intermediaries & content creators can be heard. Decisions can be challenged, so Section 69A is constitutional.

Read down Section 79:

The court clarified that intermediaries will only be liable for content if they receive a court order or any government order.

Intermediaries cannot be forced to remove content based on private complaints.

Ratio Decidendi:

The court held section 66A does not fall under grounds of Article 19(2)

Restrictions on speech must fall strictly in Article 19(2) must relate to:

• Public order   
• Decency   
• Morality   
• Defamation 
• Incitement to offence

Other than these grounds, it is unconstitutional.

Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, punishes speech merely because it was offensive, annoying, and obscene.

Intermediaries are only liable after a court or government order. They must act only when a valid order is there.

Blocking powers under Section 69A are valid only when there are safeguards that provide procedural safeguards. 

• Reasons are recorded.
• There is a hearing.
• The decision can be reviewed.

Impact of Decision:

• Restoration of free speech on the internet.
• Striking down the section eliminates the misuse by police and politicians.
• Intermediaries cannot be forced to remove content without a proper legal order.
• Clear procedures for blocking content.